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 On 31 May 1916, the two most powerful battle-fleets in the world clashed off the coast of Denmark, 
in what in Britain has become known as the Battle of Jutland. In reality the battle was more of a 
skirmish from which the German High Seas Fleet, having accidentally run into the British Grand Fleet, 
was able to extricate itself and escape to base, leaving the British in control of the battlefield. 
However, in the 16 hours during which this drama played out, 25 ships were sunk, claiming more 
than 8500 lives. The Grand Fleet suffered 14 of the ships sunk and around 6000 of the lost sailors. 
More than 5000 of the British dead were lost on five ships that exploded, killing nearly every sailor 
aboard the ships. One such case was the first ship sunk in the battle, HMS Indefatigable, which sunk 
with all but two of its complement of 1019 (Harper, 1927: 117). 
The battlefield, in which 24 of the ships were sunk—the 25th, HMS Warrior sunk while returning to 
Scotland—consists of two distinct groups of wrecks (Fig. 1). The northern group is made up of the 12 
ships sunk during the opening daylight actions, the Battlecruiser Action, in which HMS Indefatigable 
was sunk, and the later Fleet Action, from which the Germans retired. The southern group comprises 
the 12 ships either sunk or scuttled as the High Seas Fleet returned to base during the Night Action, 
cutting across the rear of the Grand Fleet. SMS V4 was the last ship sunk during this time. The 
positions shown on Figure 1 are derived from Harper (1927: 110), a record of the battle compiled by 
the captain of the Royal Navy’s navigational school, and are the locations that were estimated by 
him in 1919 for where the ships were sunk. By surveying the entire battlefield in 2015, the author 
has shown that the Harper Record is a consistently accurate depiction of the battle (McCartney, 
2016: 243–251). 
On ten expeditions over the past 17 years the author has been instrumental in the discovery, 
recording, and interpretation of all of the wrecks sunk at Jutland. In 2015 the degree of knowledge 
about the wrecks was transformed by the application of swath bathymetry (multibeam) survey to 
each of the known wreck-sites (McCartney, 2016). This formed the basis on which future research at 
Jutland could be focused. A portion of fieldwork and research carried out in 2016 is the subject of 
this article. This was primarily aimed at resolving the last outstanding questions relating to the loss 
of two ships, the battlecruiser HMS Indefatigable, and the previously unfound German torpedo boat 
SMS V4. 
 
 Figure 1. The Jutland battlefield showing the distribution of the ships sunk as depicted in Harper 
(1927: 110) (InnesMcCartney). 
Reinvestigation of HMS Indefatigable 
HMS Indefatigable was the lead ship of the class and represented a stretched version of the first 
generation of British battlecruisers, the Invincible Class (Fig. 2). The ship was constructed at 
Devonport and launched in 1909. After service in the Mediterranean, HMS Indefatigable joined 
Admiral Beatty’s Battlecruiser Fleet (BCF) based in Rosyth in early 1915, from whence it sortied for 
the Battle of Jutland the following year. The BCF, operating as an independent reconnaissance force 
of the main British Fleet, encountered the German all-battlecruiser First Scouting Group (1SG) in the 
late afternoon on 31 May. 
 
A running fight between both lines of ships, known as the ‘Run to the South’ soon followed, in which 
HMS Indefatigable was the last of the six ships in the BCF line. Fighting began at 15:45 with both 
lines of ships opening fire at the same time (Harper, 1927: 20). The action had been going on for 
around 17 minutes when, according to both Harper (1927: 21) and the official German historian 
Groos (TNA ADM 186/626: 41), HMS Indefatigable was sunk at around 16:02 when the ship was seen 
to violently explode. The last ship in the 1SG line, SMS Von der Tann, had seemingly by prompt and 
accurate fire, rapidly destroyed a British battlecruiser. 
 
Figure 2. HMS Indefatigable: Displacement: 18,500 tons, Length: 180m, eight 12-inch guns, sixteen 
4-inch guns (with permission, World Ship Society collection). 
The explosive nature of British cordite when ignited in confined spaces was certainly the cause of the 
loss of Indefatigable. Malpractice in the handling of cordite has long been understood by the Royal 
Navy as the primary cause that three British battlecruisers at Jutland blew up so readily. By 
overriding the safety features, such as anti-flash doors in turret structures, an uninterrupted path for 
naked flame was created from turret to magazine, so that a hit in the region of a turret would almost 
inevitably lead to a devastating explosion (Lambert, 1998). 
 Figure 3. Multibeam plan view of the wreck of HMS Indefatigable as seen in April 2015 (Innes 
McCartney/JD-Contractor). 
The wreck of HMS Indefatigable remained undiscovered until located and dived by the author in 
2001 when the site was photographed and recorded on video (McCartney, 2016: 37–41). The wreck 
was seen to be very broken down and dispersed, possibly upside down. At the time there were no 
practical means by which an accurate map of the wreck-site could be derived, because it was too 
large and too deep (48m) to be measured using traditional diver-deployed techniques. What was 
needed was a geophysical survey. This finally occurred in 2015 when, in conjunction with 
underwater specialists JD-Contractor and its owner, Gert Normann Andersen, all the known wrecks 
of the Battle of Jutland, including HMS Indefatigable, were surveyed with high-grade swath 
bathymetry (multibeam) (Fig. 3). 
The 2015 survey revealed that the wreck was violently dispersed over an even wider area than the 
2001 dives had shown. An ROV was used to examine some of the outlying features uncovered by the 
multibeam and to confirm that the bow was pointing to the south-west. Three turrets were 
observed among the wreckage, with the fourth not identified. It was something of a revelation to 
see that craters made in the seabed by pieces of debris flying out of the ship when it exploded could 
still be seen 100 years after the event. The survey clearly demonstrated that, in accordance with the 
both Harper (1927: 20) and Groos (TNA ADM 186/626: 41), the fore part of the ship had exploded 
violently, seemingly leading to its destruction. 
Unresolved archaeological questions 
During the late summer of 2015, while the data from the Jutland survey was being processed and 
interpreted back in the UK, it became evident that the wreck-site was around 140m from bow to 
stern. This was odd because HMS Indefatigable was in fact 180m long   (Roberts 1997, 29) So it 
seemed that up to 40m of wreckage could not easily be accounted for. Two possible reasons for why 
this was the case were promulgated (McCartney, 2016: 41–42). Either the wreck had concertinaed 
as it sank and then impacted with the seabed, or an undiscovered portion of the stern lay some 
distance from the wreck. There was no indication from historical sources, survivor and eyewitness 
accounts, however, that the ship had broken in two, shedding around 20% of its length. 
 In 2001, before this discrepancy had emerged from the geophysical data, the wreck of HMS 
Indefatigable had thrown up another mystery, which at the time had no plausible explanation. It was 
connected to the location in which the wreck had been found. The wreck of HMS Indefatigable is 
located some five miles to the north-east of the position recorded by Harper (1927: 110) (Fig.4, Line 
C). In 2001 the positional discrepancy of five miles did not raise any suspicion because of the 
accuracy of navigation in 1916, combined with the circumstances of being in a battle. Even still, it 
was noticeable by contrast just how close the wreck of the next ship sunk in the ‘Run to the South’ 
HMS Queen Mary was to Harper’s reckoning. Importantly, it was the distance between the wrecks of 
HMS Indefatigable and HMS Queen Mary that was difficult to explain. 
The key question comes down to timing. It was known that the speed of the BCF at this time in the 
battle was limited to the maximum formatted speed of the battlecruiser HMS New Zealand—fifth in 
the BCF line and the slowest of all six ships—of 26 knots, and the line did not straggle (Gordon, 1996: 
116). Harper states that HMS Indefatigable sunk at 16:02 and HMS Queen Mary at 16:26, 24 minutes 
later (Harper, 1927: 21-–22). So by his calculations, he accurately plotted the distance between the 
two wrecks to be 10.82 nautical miles (Fig. 4, Line A), which equates to his calculating that the BCF 
was actually travelling at 27 knots, presumably pushing HMS New Zealand beyond normal 
performance. 
This seems entirely logical until the distance between the wrecks of HMS Indefatigable and HMS 
Queen Mary was measured and found to be 12.26 nautical miles (Fig. 4, Line B). Using Harper’s 
calculated speed for the BCF of 27 knots, this distance means that the wrecks are actually over 27 
minutes apart, not the recorded 24. This would require the BCF to have been making a suspiciously 
high 30 knots. The times recorded for the loss of these two ships is difficult to dispute because 
records from both sides agree. So what is the possible explanation? In 2001 none could be 
ascertained and it was described as simply the ‘fog of war’ (McCartney, 2001: 33–38). 
Results of the 2016 survey 
In early 2016 a working theory emerged that the timing question and the foreshortened nature of 
the wreck of HMS Indefatigable might be linked and have a common explanation. Was there a 
missing portion of the wreck? If there was, could it explain the outstanding question of timing? This 
led to the use of multibeam to resurvey the wreck of HMS Indefatigable. Scanning the ship’s known 
track in the minutes before it sunk became a priority during the fieldwork conducted on JD-
Contractor’s MV Vina in March 2016. 
 Figure 4. The Harper and actual positions of the wrecks of HMS Indefatigable and HMS Queen Mary 
marked on Harper Chart No. 5, showing measured distances between the wreck-sites (Innes 
McCartney). 
 
On 15 March a wide-area survey using multibeam was conducted around the wreck-site and to the 
north of HMS Indefatigable. The multibeam scan took around three hours to complete and it was 
not until near the end that the remarkable image of what appeared to be HMS Indefatigable’s entire 
stern appeared on the monitors in Vina’s survey station. The results of the survey show the 
previously known main wreck-site and a large piece of new wreckage detected 500m to the north 
(Fig. 5). The new piece of wreckage was investigated by ROV and confirmed to be the stern of HMS 
Indefatigable, upside down on the seabed (Fig. 6). Visible features included: the upside-down base 
of the counter balance at the rear of ‘X’ turret, with the open escape hatch clearly visible (Fig. 7A); 
the upper side of ‘X’ turret’s armoured barbette, which is upside down and orientated at a 45˚ angle 
(Fig. 7B); three of the ship’s propellers (Fig. 7C); and the pair of rudders, completely vertical, as the 
uppermost point of the stern of the ship (Fig. 7D). The propellers looked as if they had been pulled 
out of the wreckage as they lay some distance away from where they would have originally been 
situated. All these features clearly demonstrated that the stern of the ill-fated battlecruiser, as far 
forward as the after end of ‘X’ turret had been located, 500m from the main wreck-site. 
The results of the 2015 and 2016 multibeam surveys, backed up by visual inspections of the wreck, 
clearly show that Indefatigable suffered two devastating explosions, significantly revising what is 
known of how the ship sunk. The stern portion was blown off along a line just aft of ‘X’ turret and 
must have been caused by a detonation of the cordite magazine under ‘X’ turret (Fig. 8). Similarly, 
the multibeam shows that the fore part of the ship was destroyed by a major explosive source that 
must have been the magazine under ‘A’ turret. 
The first explosion, in ‘X’ magazine, effectively destroyed the ship. The later one, in ‘A’ magazine, 
reduced the fore part of the ship to small pieces and occurred as it was sinking and after it had 
ceased to have any fighting value. At the time it occurred, according to Brown (2003: 339–349), the 
crew were already dead as a supersonic shock wave caused by the ‘X’ magazine detonation would 
have devastated the interior of the ship, killing all inside its structure. This explains why there were 
so few survivors from the battlecruisers sunk at Jutland, and from HMS Hood sunk in 1941. 
The Carne photograph re-examined 
A photograph showing HMS Indefatigable sinking was re-examined in the light of the discovery of 
the stern section of the wreck (Fig. 9). The photograph was taken by Midshipman W. P. Carne from a 
position in the after torpedo control station on HMS New Zealand. It shows HMS Indefatigable , 
leaning very heavily to port and sinking by the stern. The notable absence of New Zealand’s wake 
attests to several eyewitness accounts that Indefatigable hauled off to starboard, out of line, and on 
New Zealand’s starboard quarter after it was hit aft. We now know the ship would have been 
completely out of control, having lost all means of steering and propulsion. 
 Figure 5. The results of the wide-area multibeam survey around the wreck of HMS Indefatigable 
(Innes McCartney/JD-Contractor). 
The BCF’s track was broadly to the south-east (Fig. 4). It has been known since the 2015 survey that 
the wreck points to the south-west (Fig. 3), but it is particularly interesting to note the dispersal of 
pieces of wreckage seen on the wide-area multibeam survey of the wreck taken in 2016 (Fig. 5). This 
seems to show the course of the fore part of the ship as it turned and rolled to starboard before 
sinking. It appears that it turned sharply at around the time it sunk. 
In the light of the discovery of the stern of the ship in 2016, it seems the photograph held a 
previously unnoticed surprise: a pall of smoke clearly emanating from the surface of the sea, some 
distance aft of the sinking fore part of the ship. In all probability this represents the aftermath of the 
explosion of ‘X’ magazine; an innocuous detail of no significance until the stern was discovered. This 
one photograph seems then to capture the entire sinking process sometime between the two 
magazine explosions. 
Comparisons to the eyewitness record 
The discovery that HMS Indefatigable had broken in two is surprising because there is no reference 
to this happening in any text referring to the battle the author has so far found. The most detailed 
analysis of the fFighting at Jutland makes no mention of it (Campbell, 1986: 60–61), and it must 
therefore be surmised that it was not evident to those looking at the ship at the time it occurred. 
Eyewitness accounts naturally do not always report events consistently, however, the most detailed 
accounts are worthy of closer examination. 
The nearest witnesses were on the ship ahead, HMS New Zealand, and it was torpedo officer, Lt 
Cmdr Lovett-Cameron, stationed in the after conning tower, who has left us the most detailed 
account. Without opportunity to fire torpedoes he watched Indefatigable sink in detail through 
binoculars: 
… she had been hit aft, apparently by the mainmast, and a good deal of smoke was coming from her 
superstructure aft, but there were no flames visible...We were altering course to port at the time and 
apparently her steering gear was damaged as she did not follow round in our wake, but held on until 
she was about 500 yards on our starboard quarter, in full view of the conning tower... she was [then] 
hit by two shells, one on the fo’c’sle and one on the fore turret. Both shells appeared to explode on 
impact. Then there was an interval of about 30 seconds, during which there was absolutely no fire or 
flame or smoke, except the little actually formed by the burst of the two shells, which was not 
considerable. At the end of the interval of about 30 seconds the ship completely blew up, apparently 
from forward. The main explosion started with sheets of flame, followed immediately afterwards by 
dense dark smoke which obscured the ship from view. (Fawcett and Hooper, 1921: 38) 
Although detailed, it must be borne in mind that as the ship directly ahead of Indefatigable, HMS 
New Zealand was not well situated to see its stern, because it would have been obscured by the rest 
of the ship. Although Lovett-Cameron’s account is detailed, he clearly only began to look at 
Indefatigable after it had it been hit aft, and the stern was already on the seabed. He must have 
been situated next to Midshipman Carne who took the photograph, so that by the time 
Indefatigable turned, out of control, on to New Zealand’s starboard quarter, it would have appeared 
as if the stern of the ship was under water. The question to be asked about this account is how long 
did the process described by Lovett-Cameron take to play out? In relation to this, and equally 
importantly, when during this process was the time of the destruction of the ship recorded? 
Little extra can be garnered from the only account from the two survivors. Signaller C. Falmer and 
Able Seaman Elliot were seemingly in the foretop when the ship blew up. Falmer’s later account 
states: 
There was a terrific explosion aboard the ship—the magazines went. I saw the guns go up in the air 
just like matchsticks, bodies and everything. She was beginning to settle down. Within half a minute 
the ship turned right over and she was gone. I was 180 foot up and was thrown well clear of the ship. 
(Steel and Hart 2003: 95–96) 
 
Figure 6. A close-up of the multibeam scan of the stern portion of HMS Indefatigable as discovered 
in March 2016 showing the upside-down stern with its twin rudders, the armoured barbette lying aft 
of the upside-down ‘X’ turret (Innes McCartney/JDContractor/MSP). 
The evidence of how the ship sunk seems to point to the explosion referred to being the one in ‘X’ 
magazine. If this is so, then again the question is one of timing. How long did this account take to 
play out? 
Perhaps the witnesses who saw the most detail were the German gunners on Indefatigable’s 
nemesis, the battlecruiser SMS Von der Tann. It is known to have recorded opening fire at 15:49. An 
account by the Gunnery Officer, KK Mahrholz, states that: 
The semi armoured piercing shell only exploded inside and therefore a hit result could only be seen 
when the interior was clearly destroyed. I guarded myself from observing hits, and adhered strictly to 
observing the fall of shot … Meanwhile the fire from Von der Tann was extraordinarily successful, and 
the enemy disappeared completely sometimes in the surrounding columns of water … Then 14 
minutes after the opening of fire the enemy caught fatal wounds... I saw a giant explosion in the aft 
gun turret, a bright flash flame pushed out and ships debris was thrown in a wide arc in the air, 
seemingly it was the turret roof, which through pressure of the explosion inside had been thrown out. 
The next salvo gave the ship the rest, it hit further forward and had the result that soon after the 
impact a tremendous black smoke cloud climbed from the ship reaching double the mast height and 
the ship completely disappeared from sight. (Mahrholz, 1930) 
 
Figure 7. Images from the ROV survey of the newly discovered stern of HMS Indefatigable, March 
2016: A) base of the counterbalance at the rear of the ‘X’ turret, with escape hatch; B) upper side of 
‘X’ turret’s armoured barbette; C) three of the ship’s propellers; D) pair of rudders, (Innes 
McCartney/JD-Contractor). 
It is clear in this account that Mahrholz witnessed the destruction of Indefatigable from an angle 
where the entire sequence of events was visible. It also offers some detail in terms of timing. Firstly, 
the explosions that sunk the ship were not immediately linked to hits but took an appreciable period 
of time to become apparent because they occurred inside Indefatigable and took time to build up 
and be visible from Von der Tann. Secondly, after the explosion of the stern, it seems it was the next 
salvo that created the explosion that ultimately created the black pall of smoke, also witnessed by 
Lovett-Cameron, but, again, there is a question of how long this took to play out. 
 Figure 8. The locations of magazines, boilers, and engines within HMS Indefatigable, the detonation 
of the magazine under ‘X’ turret caused the ship to sink by the stern. The fore part under ‘A’ turret 
exploded later (Innes McCartney). 
 
Problematically for the unresolved question of timing, one point on which there seems to be 
agreement among witnesses is the time of the explosion of the stern to have been around 16:02. For 
example, three German torpedo boats B98, B97 and V30 all individually recorded the stern 
exploding at 16:02 (Campbell, 1986: 61). On the British side, this is the time Harper opted for after 
he must have assessed all the written evidence available to him (Harper, 1927: 21). The most recent 
analysis carried on the battle supports this view (Brooks, 2016: 198). So Von der Tann initially must 
have hit Indefatigable some time before this with the deadly hit taking an undetermined period of 
time to develop into the ‘X’ magazine explosion, witnessed by all. At some point before 16:02 
Indefatigable could well have been in trouble. 
How long this explosion took to develop is difficult to evaluate, but it may not have been immediate. 
Recent analysis of a similar hit on ‘Q’ turret of Admiral Beatty’s flagship HMS Lion—only saved from 
a similar fate by rapid magazine flooding—reveals that a period of time, possibly of minutes, elapsed 
from the time the turret was struck until the charges in the working chamber and then the handling 
room ignited. Accounts differ in how long it took, but it was certainly far from immediate (Brooks, 
2016: 196–197). From the Mahrholz account, it is known that Von der Tann was straddling 
Indefatigable from its third salvo, when a hit was seen (Staff, 2014: 46). 
 Figure 9. HMS Indefatigable on its side and sinking by the stern, as seen from HMS New Zealand. The 
area circled in red seems to show a pall of smoke where the stern had already sunk to the seabed 
(Imperial War Museum Q64302). 
Von der Tann reported firing 13 salvoes at Indefatigable in 13 minutes, for an average of one salvo 
every 69 seconds. Even allowing for reports that the firing became more rapid towards the end 
(Mahrholz, 1930; Brooks, 2016: 198) it would seem that the next two known hits in one salvo 
occurred up to a minute after the 16:02 explosion. How long these took to develop into ‘A’ magazine 
detonation, if related, can be estimated based on Lovett-Cameron’s account that it occurred at least 
30 seconds later. 
After this time the ship then took an appreciable period of time to sink, with this occurring behind a 
pall of smoke. One account written by sub-Lt. Stephen King-Hall (later Baron King-Hall of Headley) 
noted that it was possibly as late was 16:15 that the 200m-high (700ft) mushroom cloud that 
developed, denoting the spot where HMS Indefatigable finally sunk, was still fiery red at its base, 
suggesting a portion of the ship was still burning at that time (King-Hall, 1916). 
Conclusion 
Of the two outstanding questions related to the destruction of Indefatigable that had been posed by 
archaeological investigations of the wreck-site up to 2015, only one has been satisfactorily resolved. 
It was confirmed in 2016 that the ship broke into two distinct portions and that the cause was the hit 
aft reported by eyewitnesses, none of whom noticed it breaking at that time. 
Far more problematic is the question of timing. The wreck of Indefatigable remains at a distance 
from the wreck Queen Mary that is difficult to immediately resolve from what we currently know. 
Indefatigable definitely blew up at 16:02. There are too many witnesses recording the time to 
comfortably suggest they got it wrong. Moreover, the ship may have then taken a few minutes to 
sink entirely. One possible explanation is that an early hit by Von der Tann took 2–3 minutes to 
develop into the 16:02 explosion but had the effect of slowing and turning the ship, but this is only a 
theory and far from certain. Alternatively, HMS Queen Mary may have sunk later than supposed or 
the speed of the BCF been underestimated for some reason. We may never know for certain. The 
discovery that the wreck is in two parts, however, does not on its own help resolve this question 
satisfactorily. 
 
Figure 10. The torpedo boat SMS V4, length: 233ft, displacement: 689 tons, two 3.46-inch (88mm) 
guns of 30 calibre, one forward and one aft in single mounts, four 19.7-inch torpedo tubes with two 
mounted singly aft of the forecastle, one amidships on the centreline and one aft (Archiv Deutscher 
Marinebund). 
SMS V4 
SMS V4 was one of six torpedo boats built for the 1911–1912 construction programme by the Vulcan 
yard at Stettin, hence the ‘V’ prefix to the ship’s name (Fig. 10). They were not considered to be a 
successful design, suffering from poor seakeeping, and by 1913 the German navy had adopted an 
alternative design (Gröner, 1990: 178). Nevertheless, one single flotilla, the 5th, was entirely of this 
class of vessel and was present at Jutland. The 5th Flotilla was made up of two half flotillas, the 10th 
and the 9th, in which SMS V4 was serving. During the close of the night phase of the battle the 5th 
Flotilla had been stationed towards the van of the German battle-fleet as it made its way back to 
Germany. 
SMS V4 became the last ship to sink in action at the Battle of Jutland. At 02:15 on 1 June, around five 
minutes after the pre-dreadnought battleship SMS Pommern had blown up after a British torpedo 
attack, the small torpedo boat seemingly suffered an underwater explosion. The bows were 
completely blown off, killing 17. The rest of the crew were picked up and the ship was finished off by 
gunfire and a torpedo from SMS V6. Why V4 sunk has never been fully explained. Groos, the official 
German historian, concluded that either it had hit a drifting torpedo or mine, or had suffered an 
internal explosion by some unknown cause (TNA ADM 186/626: 203). 
During the 2015 survey, this wreck-site was not a known target and, although we checked out some 
promising net snags in the vicinity of where it was reported sunk, the wreck was not found. By the 
time of the 2016 survey, things had changed. This was primarily because it had become evident from 
the results of the 2015 survey that Harper (1927) and its unpublished charts (Harper, 1919) 
represented in most cases a very accurate spatial portrayal of the battle. A re-examination of all data 
available for the time period shortly after SMS Pommern was sunk revealed that Harper’s analysis 
was likely sound and that the wreck of SMS V4 must lie very near his reported position. 
A further examination of known fishing snags in the area revealed a very small snag that was close to 
Harper’s position. On the morning of 14 March 2016 Vina’s multibeam system surveyed this position 
and the unmistakable signature image of a small warship, as seen during surveys of 11 similar ships 
in the previous years, was revealed (Fig. 11). In nearly every case only the heavy machinery now 
remains. Time and the hostile marine environment of the North Sea have contributed to reducing 
these smaller wrecks to a broken-down state. 
The site was inspected by ROV and also by Vina’s divers, Toni Andersen and Denis Normann 
Andersen. All of the data gathered confirmed that this was the wreck of a Kaiserliche Marine 
torpedo boat. The highest feature showing on the wreck was at the extreme stern and is the ship’s 
rudder post (Fig. 12A). It is not unusual for this feature to be seen on German torpedo boats of this 
era. They also featured twin engine rooms, each fitted with a single turbine and condenser. In this 
case the turbine can be seen, but the condenser is no longer present, leaving a rectangular void 
visible where it would have been fitted (Fig. 12B). The boilers present on the wreck were of the 
Thorneycroft type extensively fitted to German vessels of this period (McCartney, 2016: 26). In this 
case the forward boiler was double length, the after end of which can be seen in Figure 12C. The two 
boilers in the centre of the ship faced each other, where they would be loaded with coal. The 
conjunction between these boilers was clearly visible (Fig. 12D). 
It was recognized in the 2015 survey data that, in nearly every case, all that remains of the 
destroyers and torpedo boats sunk at Jutland is the heavy machinery and occasionally some 
dispersed wreckage on the seabed. So a useful tool was devised, using a typology based on the 
construction drawings of the holds of each class of small warship. Drawings were laid over the 
multibeam scans of the wrecks and were instrumental in identifying each wreck-site (McCartney, 
2016: 25). For example, this methodology was used on the multibeam plan view of SMS V4 and the 
main features of boilers and turbines line up very well (Fig. 13). SMS V4 was the only torpedo boat of 
the 1911–1912 order to be sunk at Jutland.  These facts likely prove that the wreck is SMS V4. Its 
proximity to the position calculated by Harper (1927) is additional proof of the accuracy of his 
records both in terms of time and place. 
  
Figure 11. Multibeam plan view of the wreck of SMS V4 as found in March 2016 (Innes 
McCartney/JD-Contractor). 
 
One interesting element of the survey of this site was that it revealed that the bows pointed around 
90 degrees out of line with the known path the ship was taking. The wreck points to the south-west, 
whereas SMS V4 was heading south-east when the ship exploded. Perhaps the circumstances by 
which the crew were rescued from the floating remains of the ship had some bearing on how it is 
orientated. It is known that the sea state was rising (TNA ADM 186/626: 203) and the weather report 
from the nearest weather station, Blaavunds Huk, Denmark, shows the wind to be from the south 
(Metrological Office, 1916: 153), aiding which may have aided in swinging the floating portion of the 
ship around. 
 Figure 12. Images from the ROV survey of the wreck of SMS V4 on the day it was discovered: A) 
rudder post; B) turbine; C) Thorneycroft forward boiler; D) the two boilers. (Innes McCartney/JD-
Contractor). 
 Figure 13. The hull form and machinery distribution plan for SMS V4 laid over the multibeam plan 
view (Innes McCartney/JD-Contractor). 
Also of note was the fact that all of the larger bronze components and guns had been removed from 
the site at some point in the past. This was attested not only by visual inspection of the site by divers 
and ROV but also by the multibeam survey. The condensers, usually housed next to the turbines in 
V4’s two engine rooms are absent from the multibeam scans, while the turbines remain (Fig. 13). 
The lack of condensers was seen on the at least six of the small warships both scanned with 
multibeam and visually inspected in 2015 (McCartney, 2016: 255). The commercial salvage of the 
bronze components from the smaller warships has been a recent activity at Jutland because, to the 
author’s knowledge, these wrecks have only been located since around 2001. 
 Figure 14. The Jutland battlefield as known in March 2016 showing the actual positions of each 
wreck-site compared the positions given in the Harper Record. The red lines show the difference 
between Harper’s estimations and the actual wrecks (Innes McCartney). 
 
In summary 
The March 2016 survey of the Jutland battlefield satisfactorily resolved two primary research 
questions. Firstly, was there a missing portion of HMS Indefatigable? Secondly, where was the wreck 
of SMS V4? 
The location of the missing stern section of HMS Indefatigable on its own was not sufficient for the 
timeline of the battle to be redrawn with accuracy. However, its discovery revealed a strong 
example of how eyewitness record of events during the battle is being challenged by archaeological 
investigations of the wrecks. No one reported seeing the ship break in two. 
In the case of V4 it has been shown that its proximity to the position outlined by Harper (1927) 
confirms the timing and location where the last ship sunk in the battle. This supports the established 
premise that the Harper Record is a broadly correct chronology of the battle, with an average 
positional discrepancy of less than 3.5 miles (McCartney 2016, 244-245) (Fig 14). 
Regrettably there is evidence on both wreck-sites that commercial salvage for profit has been 
carried out on them at some time in the past. At least one propeller has disappeared from the 
Indefatigable site and the condensers have been removed from V4. The two wrecks fall into the 65% 
of Jutland’s wrecks where it is evident commercial salvage has taken place. It is sincerely hoped that 
the pending ratification of the 2001 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural 
Heritage by Denmark and Holland will help bring this unsavoury practice to a close before the wrecks 
lose much of their archaeological potential. 
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